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Inscribing the State:  Constitution Drafting Manuals as Textual Technologies 
Sara Kendall, University of Kent  
  
Governing through Text 
The production of states is often regarded as matter of power:  of drawing together 
political elites, proxies for external interests, and sentiments that tap into what is figured as 
WKHµSRSXODUZLOO¶,QDPRUHFULWLFDOYHLQLWLVUHDGLQUHODWLRQWRSRVWFRORQLDOLQKHULWDQFHV
that continue to haunt contemporary state structures. State-building technologies have 
evolved into technocratic exercises in ensuring that rights are protected, internal forms of 
state power are separated and subjected to checks and balances, and principles of fairness and 
constraint are enshrined in legislation. Many of these objectives appear as legal problems to 
be addressed through the drafting of a written constitution, an emblem of modern political 
statehood. Yet these projects appear to be increasingly delegated to technRFUDWLFµH[SHUWV¶
who are thought to have harnessed the formulae for producing viable states. Constitutional 
production has expanded beyond a process of political deliberation into an industry of expert 
knowledge. 
The rise of expert knowledge in constitutional matters marks a turn toward 
µFRQVWLWXWLRQDOWHFKQLFLW\¶ZKHUHFRQVWLWXWLRQGUDIWLQJLVUHJDUGHGDVDGRPDLQRIWHFKQLFDO
expertise inhabited by neutral and politically divested actors.1 This article considers the 
emergence of the constitution drafting manual or handbook in the post-Cold War period as a 
genre in which technical expertise seeks to confront and regulate the political. Produced by 
and circulated within a diverse network of actors, these documents consolidate a view of 
what constLWXWHVµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶LQWKHSURGXFWLRQRIFRQWHPSRUDU\VWDWH identity. Yet in 
claiming that they merely reflect what they present as an existing consensus of state 
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construction, these manuals also act into the field of state-building, naturalizing particular 
understandings of the ontology of the state that reflect liberal legalist norms. 
This article takes up and interrogates these texts to consider their underlying 
presumptions, revealing the active role of textual practices in the production of contemporary 
state forms. The provision of information is not only a matter of recording and presenting an 
account of what exists, but also a way of acting into the world through forms of inscription.2 
The state is increasingly inscribed not only through the constitution itself, but also by what 
precedes its emergence:  expert consultations, trainings in legislative drafting, and the content 
of constitution-drafting reports, manuals and handbooks that influence the texts of state 
constitutions. In this sense the constitution drafting manual forms part of a broader dispositif, 
an assemblage of multiple elements such as µdiscourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions¶DQGWKHµV\VWHPRIUHODWLRQV¶EHWZHHQHOHPHQWV that 
enable the tracing of power beyond its most apparent locations.3 It has become a familiar 
feature of the more avowedly political practice of constitution drafting:  a technocratic 
accompaniment that seeks to shape and inform the discursive terrain where terms and phrases 
are translated into foundational legal authority. 
The constitution drafting manual is one of many technologies of state formation, 
which include textual as well as material practices. State-building can be regarded as a 
conceptual projectDVZLWK-DPHV6FRWW¶Vclaim that states come to µVHH¶WKURXJKtechnologies 
such as property regiVWHUVFHQVXVHVDQGOHJDOFRGHVDQG7LPRWK\0LWFKHOO¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI
µPRGHUQLVLQJ¶SUDFWLFHVIURPWKHFRORQLDOHUDWKDWHQWDLOH[WHQGLQJORJLFVRIWHFKQLFDOFRQWURO
over territories and populations.4 Constitutions offer another political optic of modern 
statehood, and the broader context from which they emerge now includes a range of 
interventions in the formative stages of constitution drafting. In the post-Cold War present, 
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situated within a normative order structured by µUXOHRIODZ¶DQGµJRRGJRYHUQDQFH¶ 
discourses and policy agendas, states that are viewed as unable to render their territory and 
population sufficiently visible for governing are subjected to forms of assistance to bring 
them into line with standards of contemporary µstate-ness¶. As Nehal Bhuta argues, the end of 
WKH&ROG:DUEURXJKWµDQHZWHFKQLFR-practical discourse of state-ness, in which the state is 
understood as (partly or predominantly) a technical achievement, amenable to a variety of 
programmes of intentional institutional design «and expert knowledge claims about how to 
JHQHUDWH³VWDWHVWUHQJWK´DQGFRPEDW³VWDWHZHDNQHVV´¶5  Constitutions are one such site of 
technical interventions, where states are encouraged WRSURSHUO\µVHH¶LQOLQHZLWKDVHWRI
values that are presented as politically neutral and universalizable.  Sovereignty, constituent 
power, conceptions of the demos, and political values are given discursive and textual form at 
the site of the constitution, which answers back in increasingly standardized ways about 
devolution, rights, and electoral systems.6 How have these values and forms been normalized, 
and how have constitution drafting manuals emerged as part of the contemporary state-
building dispositif?  
Conceptions of constitutionality and the optics of µstate-ness¶ are transmitted through 
a broad network of agency, from state representatives to UN agencies, non-governmental 
organizations and scholar-practitioners. Many of these actors participate in the production of 
modern constitutionality under the ambiguous and presumptively shared category of 
µWHFKQLFDOH[SHUWLVH¶'DYLG.HQQHG\GHVFULEHVLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOµH[SHUWV¶DVUXOLQJE\
articulation, through practices of description that are considered neutral and advisory. By 
GUDZLQJWRJHWKHUDQGSURYLGLQJDGYLFHµH[SHUWV¶DOVRVKDSHWKHEDFNJURXQGVFHQHLQZKLFK
later decisions are taken.7 ,QWKLVVHQVHWKRVHZKRSURGXFHDQGSURYLGHµH[SHUW¶NQRZOHGJH
help to establish the frame for the political discussions to follow among legislators, 
legislative advisors, and the assemblage of actors who inscribe a constitution into being. The 
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language of technocratic µexpertise¶ suggests that this background work is apolitical and 
divested, and yet as Kennedy argues, such expertise itself is a form of politics. 
A growing body of literature has addressed the phenomenon of expert knowledge in 
the international legal field, such as rule of law and transitional justice interventions as well 
as what is broadly referred to as state-building.8 By contrast, the emergence of the 
constitution drafting manual in the decades following the end of the Cold War has received 
little scholarly attention. The following sections explore how such texts govern, beginning 
from the manual or handbook itself as a distinct genre in constitution drafting. Taking up two 
examples of these manuals, I show how they seek to consolidate a vision of state-ness that is 
exportable, risk-averse, and ultimately utopian. While their background role in constitutional 
formation makes it harder to trace their direct causal contribution to the political process, the 
very existence of constitution drafting manuals reveals the technicity of our time and how it 
shapes perceptions of the global legal order. The constitution drafting manual increasingly 
sets the framing terms and logics from which state forms are drawn, inscribing limits through 
exclusions and inclusions, and manifesting part of a broader apparatus of state-ness that could 
be examined outside and beyond the directly political matter of legislating constitutional 
forms. 
The Rise of the Manual 
As textual approaches that inform the development and interpretation of law, manuals 
and handbooks have become a common feature of legal practice, yet relatively little has been 
written about them.9 They perform functions that range from articulating the state of the law, 
a more descriptive exercise, to shaping the development of future law, yet even 
µUHVWDWHPHQWV¶RIDSSOLFDEOHODZDFWLQWRWKHOHJDOILHOG)RUH[DPSOH:RXWHU:HUQHUKDV
shown how international humanitarian law manuals both restate existing law and contribute 
to the development of law through repetition, seeking to consolidate and make normative 
 5 
sense of an ongoing interpretive practice.10 Although not formal acts of lawmaking, these 
manuals have two temporal orientations, facing toward both past restatement and future 
development of the law. As restatements operating through repetition, international 
humanitarian law manuals also alter the content of the law through this iterative process, 
asserting and re-contextualizing rules and principles. Werner compares these manuals to the 
more familiar form of the consumer product manual, illustrating their shared objectives of 
reducing complexity and offering concrete instructions to foreseeable users. Yet the 
SDUWLFXODUNLQGRIµSURGXFW¶WKDWODZPDQXDOVRIIHULVGLVWLQct, produced through expert 
knowledge and articulating normative requirements. The constitution drafting manual shares 
some of these attributes that Werner identifies in international humanitarian law manuals, but 
the link to lex ferenda is even stronger here:  beyond restating the law as it is, constitution 
drafting manuals seek to establish and fix the field of possibilities for legal frameworks still 
WRFRPH7KHµSURGXFWV¶RIMXULGLFDOWHFKQRORJLHVDUHJULGIRUPDWLRQVDQGFODVVLILFDWLRQ
schemes ± forms of ordering ± and the act of legislation translates the political and 
administrative into these legal forms.11 Constitution drafting manuals seek to participate in 
these acts of translation from the political into the legal. The field of information that they 
consolidate and present to legislative drafters may ultimately shape the constitutional 
conditions of possibility. 
While the constitution drafting handbook or manual as a site of international expert 
knowledge became more prominent in the post-Cold War era, there were precursors from at 
least the nineteenth century. Tailored manuals were developed to inform specific 
constitutional conventions, as with a late 19th century manual for the constitutional 
convention for the state of New York, which compiled the constitutions of states from Europe 




By a perusal of these constitutions the delegate may be informed upon the systems 
of government under which many of the citizens of this great State, more 
cosmopolitan in character than any under the sun, have been governed in their 
native lands. It is possible that in more than one of these plans of government the 
Convention will find provisions which, modified and improved under its wise 
deliberation, may be found especially adapted to the wants and requirements of the 
citizens of the Empire State.12 





interest in comparing other state constitutional provisions as opposed to indigenous practices 
of governing. The reference manual for drafting an Australian federal constitution followed 
similar logics, aiming to guide members of the Australasian Convention by reference to three 
different constitutional models (the United States, Canada, and Switzerland).13 
Scholars have argued that the formal settings of the constitutional convention or the 
treaty negotiation do not capture the ways in which constituting a people or a foundational 
moment are products of negotiation and adaptation, and political outcomes involved far more 
contingency and local interactions than formal documents would suggest.14 Yet constitutional 
manuals and the conditions of their making can be read as indexing certain assumptions ± in 
WKH1HZ<RUNH[DPSOHRIWKHIRUPWKDWDFRQVWLWXWLRQVKRXOGWDNHLQOLJKWRIWKHSROLW\¶V
composition of citizens from a plurality of backgrounds, with fellow citizens assembling 
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comparative constitutional provisions as political actors. How does this shift with the rise of 
technical or expert advice from outside? 
The example of the redrafting of the New York state constitution is distinct from the 
twentieth-century provision of technical advice during decolonization, marking a shift from a 
NLQGRIURPDQWLFLVPFRQFHUQLQJFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\WRZKDWFRXOGEHWHUPHGµFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
FLYLOLW\¶15  Constitutional romanticism regards constitutions as harboring a sacral or mythic 
FKDUDFWHULQFDSWXULQJµWKHZLOORIWKHSHRSOH¶RUUHYROXWLRQDU\SRWHQWLDOZKHUHDV
constitutional civility seeks to develop more predictable and beneficial future relations 
through constitutional forms, as with the departing French, British and Belgian colonial 
powers who sought to imprint their own legal forms on nascent postcolonial states. Rather 
WKDQFRPSDULQJSURYLVLRQVIURPHOVHZKHUHWRVHHZKHWKHUWKH\ZRXOGFRQIRUPWRDSROLW\¶V
specific political needs, colonial state forays into postcolonial state-building revealed a desire 
to produce states in their own image and to enhance trade with former colonies. According to 
Nehal Bhuta, colonial state-EXLOGLQJSURMHFWVZHUHµODERUDWRULHV for the liberal reformist 
fantasy that whole peoples could first be grasped as objects of knowledge, and then 
reconstituted as political subjects through long-WHUPLQWHUYHQWLRQDQGRYHUVLJKW¶16 These 
relations unfolded in multiple directions. Colonial authorities introduced legislative 
assemblies and appointed representatives who were hosted at constitutional conferences for 
emerging postcolonial states, which were held in former colonial centers. Meanwhile, British 
legislative drafters were sent to decolonizing states and produced manuals to aid their 
VXFFHVVRUV2QHFRPPHQWDWRUQRWHGWKDWWKHVHPDQXDOVµSUHVHUYHGWKHP\WKWKDWGUDIWHUVGR
QRWPDNHVXEVWDQWLYHGHFLVLRQV¶E\PDLQWDLQLQJWKDWWKH\DUHPHUHO\SXWWLQJLQWRZRUGVWKH
policy decisions that had already been taken, yet drafters were encouraged to contest 
provisions that were considered contrary to the rule of law.17 The resulting texts shored up 
the authority of the departing colonial powers; for example, the Kenyan independence 
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constitution was a product of British legislation, deriving its validity from an act of the 
British parliament or crown.18 
As post-independence states redrafted their independence constitutions that had been 
shaped by former colonial powers, ideals of constitutional autochthony ± indigeneity or 
nativity ± drove some of the reforms.19  In comparative constitutional law, scholars have 
referred to the tensions between DXWRFKWKRQ\DQGERUURZLQJDVWKHµWUDQVSODQWVGHEDWH¶20 For 
example, Mark Tushnet describes what he claims is a common view among scholars of 
FRPSDUDWLYHODZµKRZHYHUWUDQVSODQWVZRUNLQSULYDWHODZILHOGVWKH\ZRUNGLIIHUHQWO\DQG
DOPRVWFHUWDLQO\OHVVZHOOLQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODZ¶21 3ROLWLFDOVFLHQWLVWVKDYHDOVRFULWLFL]HGµthe 
export of continental European-style federal boilerplate constitutions to new federations of 
WKHGHYHORSLQJZRUOG¶22 From constitutional reforms by postcolonial states to contemporary 
scholarship on the provision of constitutional assistance, there is considerable awareness of 
the attendant ULVNVRIµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFLYLOLW\¶ZKHWKHULQWKHIRUPs assumed during 
decolonization or in less visible contemporary iterations that appear in the provision of expert 
knowledge.  
Contemporary constitution drafting guidelines emphasize inclusion, public 
participation and transparency, values that are cast as universal in nature as a kind of global 
public good.23 Claiming allegiance to these values, the UN has been involved in constitution 
reform throughout the world through the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Among the 
various manuals for UN mediators, handbooks for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
implementation manuals and handbooks for various treaty obligations, the UN Secretary 
*HQHUDO¶VRIILFHKDVSURGXFHGDµJXLGDQFHQRWH¶IRUµ8QLWHG1DWLRQs assistance to 
constitution-PDNLQJSURFHVVHV¶WKDWVNHWFKHVDSROLF\IUDPHZRUNIRU81HQJDJHPHQW24 A 
subsequent UNDP µJXLGDQFHQRWH¶EXLOGVXSRQWKLVSROLF\IUDPHZRUNFODLPLQJWKDWLWµDLPV
to provide a framework for the application of these principles in UNDP support to 
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constitution-PDNLQJ¶25 The µQRWHV¶ themselves highlight the importance of engaging and 
collaborating with national actors and local populations; rather than constitution drafting 
manuals, however, they serve more as articulations of what WKH81FRQVLGHUVWREHµEHVW




constitutional assistance resource center available internally to UN staff.26 The field of 
activity around constitution drafting assistance continues to expand, encompassing a wide 
range of non-governmental actors operating outside UN reform programs who share an 
interest in the politically divested and technocratic ethos of contemporary state-building. 
The experience of decolonization and the provision of legislative drafting manuals 
illustrates that the form of the manual itself is not new, but its presumptions and contents 
have shifted in line with changing approaches to constitutionalism in the post-Cold War era. 
Contemporary constitution drafting manuals present their work as the product of politically 
divested technical experts. For example, the Stockholm-based International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) notes in the front matter of its manual, entitled 
A Practical Guide to Constitution BuildingWKDWµ>W@KLVSXEOLFDWLRQLVLQGHSHQGHQWRIVSHFLILF
QDWLRQDORUSROLWLFDOLQWHUHVWV¶27 The Geneva-based nonprofit Interpeace similarly states that 
µ,QWHUSHDFH¶VSXEOLFDWLRQVGRQRWUHIOHFWDQ\VSHFLILFQDWLRQDORUSROLWLFDOLQWHUHVW¶28 Both of 
these manuals further claim that their views do not reflect the views of their respective 
organizations, leaving the impression that they represent a kind of de-localized and authorless 
FRQFUHWLRQRIQHXWUDOµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶<HWXQOLNHWKHUHFHQWµ&RQVWLWXWH3URMHFW¶ZHEVLWH29 
which acts as a repository of existing state constitutions and allows comparative analysis of 
different provisions, these manuals are structured to provide advice on how constitutions 
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ought to be drafted. In this way they are political actants, as described by Bruno Latour:  they 
engage as µDFWLQJDJHQWVLQWHUYHQHUV¶WKDWµPRGLI\ other actors¶ as part of a broader network 
of agency.30 
Rather than apolitical and inert archives of congealed, neutral expert knowledge, 
constitution-drafting manuals are products of situated interests that inform contemporary 
state-building. With the staQGDUGGLVFODLPHUWKDWµ>Y@LHZVH[SUHVVHGLQWKLVSXEOLFDWLRQGRQRW
necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council of Member 
6WDWHVRUWKRVHRIWKHGRQRUV¶31 ,'($¶VPractical Guide to Constitution Making reveals the 
broader network of agency in which the manual acts, including the council of member states 
and donors that serve to reinforce the value of its work and that enable its material conditions 
of possibility. In looped relations of reference and citationality, International IDEA and the 
US Institute of Peace work as external reviewers for the UNDP guidance note, further 
reinforcing consensus arRXQGµEHVW SUDFWLFH¶ZLWKLQDFRPPXQLW\RIWHFKQLFDOH[SHUWVBefore 
turning to the composition of this technical dispositif or assemblage, I first consider how the 
constitution drafting manual harbors presumptions of what is rendered possible through 
administrative ordering and particular optics of governing.  
 
Governing the Calculable 
As textual artifacts, constitution drafting manuals emerged from a broader 
constellation of post-Cold War state-building interventions. They circulate through what 
-DPHV)HUJXVRQWHUPVDµWUDQVQDWLRQDODSSDUDWXVRIJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\¶32, and enlist and are 
enlisted by a range of political entities, from states and international non-governmental 
organizDWLRQVWRµORFDO¶FLYLOVRFLHW\ :KLOHWKHSHUFHSWLRQVRIµVWDWH-QHVV¶LQthese texts 
reflect a contemporary consensus around what would and should constitute good governance, 
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the logics through which they operate can be located within a longer history of technocratic 
intervention from the colonial period to the present. 
Scholars have explored how forms of calculability were brought to bear within 
colonial projects, such as 7LPRWK\0LWFKHOO¶VDccount of %ULWDLQ¶VODWHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\
interventions in Egypt that sought to render its territory governable.33 'LDJQRVLQJDµPRGHUQ
techno-SROLWLFV¶WKDWHQJDJHVLQSURMHFWVRILPSURYHPHQWWKURXJKH[SHUWNQRZOHGJH
0LWFKHOO¶VZRUNVKRZVKRZWKHILJXUH of the expert is enmeshed in a constellation of forces 
and elements, including technology itself, that are not fully within human control despite the 
conceit of calculability accompanying technocratic expertise. James Scott makes related 
observations about the µKLJKPRGHUQLVW¶VRFLDOSURMHFWVof the early twentieth century, though 
rather than the state appearing as the site of intervention and improvement, these projects 
were carried out through the state. What these two studies hold in common is a shared 
interest in the role of technocratic elites and their techniques of governing, including legal 
logics such as the establishment of the law of properly in formalized rules and sanctions that 
DUHVHHQWREHEDVHGXSRQµSULQFLSOHVWUXHLQHYHU\FRXQWU\¶.34 Scott contends that µWKH
standardization of ODQJXDJHDQGOHJDOGLVFRXUVH¶Ls one way in which state optics take shape, 
informing what can be observed and rendered legible, and in turn, susceptible to calculation 
and refinement.35 *X\)LWL6LQFODLU¶VDUWLFOHLQWKLVVSHFLDOLVVXHobserves how UN technical 
assistance programmes for public administration and economic development were premised 
upon interwar ideas of scientific management and practices of colonial administration, 
moulding nascent states in line with technologies of government.36  
As an orientation or mindset, constitutional technicity shares an administrative 
ordering of society through simplifying techniques that attempt to streamline and standardize 
IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIJRYHUQLQJOLNHPDSSLQJSUDFWLFHVVWDWHVLPSOLILFDWLRQVµGLGQRW
successfully represent the actual activity of the society depicted, nor were they intended to; 
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they represented only that slice of it that interested thHRIILFLDOREVHUYHU¶37 In this sense, 
constitution drafting manuals frame the field of what can be seen in a particular way; they 
depict aspects of the society that can be measured and compared against others (as with 
comparative constitutionalism) or in relation to a set of abstract values and institutional forms 
WKDWDUHGHHPHGWREHµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶The post-Cold War and millennial turn to constitution 
drafting as a technology of modern state-ness also harbors presumptions about the 
perfectibility of political and social forms.  
This is not to claim that constitution drafting experts and their textual instruments are 
remaking the world through imperial logics. As constitution-drafting manuals maintain, their 
suggested practices for ordering the state are meant to provide checks on centralized power 
and to foster active civil society involvement in state formation and oversight. Commentators 
on contemporary constitution drafting observe that citizen engagement with and participation 
in constitutional processes has increased, driven in part through the development of new 
technologies.38 Yet reading the claims made in constitution drafting reports and manuals and 
E\WHFKQLFDOFRQVXOWDQWVUHYHDOVWKHZD\LQZKLFKLWVEURDGHUµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶GLVFRXUVH
naturalizes particular modes of governance, presenting them as given forms rather than as 
inherently political interventions. 
One example of this in the wake of the 2011 µ$UDE6SULQJ¶LVWKHSULYLOHJLQJRI
federalism and devolution in constitutional forms. A report developed jointly by IDEA, the 
Center for Constitutional Transitions, and the United Nations Development Programme on 
the relationship between decentralization and constitutional law in the Middle East and North 
$IULFD0(1$UHJLRQµhas as its ultimate objective to provide assistance to the effort to 
PRGHUQL]HDQGUHIRUPFRQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNVLQWKH$UDEUHJLRQ¶39 The language of 
modernization is explicit here, with the presumption that entering into modern 
constitutionality takes specific forms tKDWDUHGUDZQIURPµJOREDOEHVWSUDFWLFHV¶ 
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This report aims to bring together global best practices on a number of discrete 
elements of decentralization, by reviewing arrangements for decentralization 
around the world. The objective is to present these global best practices as 
options for further decentralization in the MENA region.40 
(DFKLWHUDWLRQRIWKHSKUDVHµJOREDOEHVWSUDFWLFHV¶VHHNVWRVROLGLI\WKHDXWKRULWDWLYHQHVVRI
WKHUHSRUW¶VFODLPVZLWKWKHWHUPµJOREDO¶VXJJHVWLQJDNLQGRIXQLYHUVDODSplicability that can 
remain unvoiced. To raise universalism also invokes its opposite, particularism, which the 
report would best avoid, as it suggests a leveling of difference between systems. Instead the 
report suggests that it has undertaken a comparatiYHDQDO\VLVIURPµDURXQGWKHZRUOG¶WR
distill the best constitutional arrangements, presenting these shared elements as part of an 
immanent global legal system, much like arguments for general principles as sources of 
international law. Similarly the logic here involves identifying convergences by way of 
comparisons, with the impression that there is a backdrop of shared order and a progressive 
arrival within that ordered frame ± .DQW¶Vµ3HUSHWXDO3HDFH¶UHQGHUHGDVDFRQWHPSRUDU\
template of best practice. 
Critical political scientists have noted the ways in which comparative federalism as a 
ILHOGRIVWXG\KDVEHHQXVHGWRVKRUHXSDQGUHLQIRUFHDSUHIHUHQFHIRUGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQµour 
findings based on the federations of the industrialized world are increasingly more systematic 
and cumulative. Yet does this gain justify the prescription of prescribing a one-size-fits-all 
IHGHUDOWUHDWPHQWIRUWKHGHYHORSLQJZRUOG"¶41 Scholars have noted how existing federal 
systems in the industrialized world drawn upon custom and informal practices, and at times 
these informal elements may override institutionalized constitutional procedures. 
Furthermore,  
the workings of federalism can only be captured once uncodified factors like 
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ethnicity, language, demographics, culture, and class structure are brought into 
the picture. Over the long-term, federal constitutions of the industrialized 
world have come to interact with such structural factors, creating political 
G\QDPLFVWKDWFDQQRWEHUHGXFHGWRIRUPDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURYLVLRQV¶42 
Despite these limitations to what can be rendered constitutionally explicit, scholars of 
FRPSDUDWLYHIHGHUDOLVPDWWLPHVPD\SUHVFULEHµWKHVHLQFRPSOHWHVNHtchings from the 
LQGXVWULDOL]HGZRUOG«WRGLYLGHGVRFLHWLHVRIWKHGHYHORSLQJZRUOGDVIHGHUDOFXUHVIRUDOO
SROLWLFDOHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOLOOV¶43 The move by academics from the analytical to the 
prescriptive and applied may result from pressure to demonstrate the policy relevance of 
scholarship in the social sciences. 
7KLVGHVLUHIRUSUHVFULELQJµEHVWSUDFWLFHV¶LVHYHQVWURQJHUDPRQJWKHFRPPXQLW\RI
practitioners who form part of the direct political economy of constitution drafting, from the 
United Nations Development Programme and the Commonwealth Secretariat to the various 
specialized non-governmental organizations such as IDEA, the Center for Constitutional 
Transitions, and the Public International and Policy Group, a self-GHVFULEHGµJOREDOpro bono 
ODZILUP¶These purveyors of technical expertise may offer policy prescriptions as if they are 
analytically grounded truths, as with the jointly drafted report on decentralization and 
constitutionalism in the MENA region. The report presents a set of political preferences for 
decentralization as a series of grounded analytical claims that will lead to clear and calculable 
effects:   
Political decentralization can also foster political competition by allowing for 
the emergence at the local level of new political parties that may eventually be 
DEOHWRFRPSHWHQDWLRQDOO\«6WUHQJWKHQLQJORFDOJRYHUQPHQWVLQFUHDVHVWKH
 15 
appeal and importance of local elections, thus lowering the stakes of national 
elections and discouraging the use of violence to gain political power.44 
7KHUHSRUW¶VODQJXDJHH[SUHVVHVDVHULHVRISUHVXPSWLRQVDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVWKDWSROLWLFDO
competition is good; that progression of a political party from the local to the national level is 
desirable; and that political participation at the local level decreases the possibility of 
violence at the national level. Each of these claims are rendered as truths in the rhetorical 
IRUPRIWKHH[SHUWUHSRUWZKLFKSUHVHQWVSUHVFULSWLRQDVIDFWWKURXJKWKHGLVFRXUVHRIµJOREDO
EHVWSUDFWLFH¶Yet other empirical accounts of devolution suggest otherwise; as Mitchell 
observed in Rule of Experts, USAID promotion of decentralization in the Nile valley 
reinforced existing inequalities despite shifts from the state to the local: 
To weaken the power of the central bureaucracy might have been a positive 
step for rural Egyptians, but the actual political outcome would depend on the 
distribution of resources and power at the provincial, district and village levels 
to which authority and funds were transferred. Local government or the 
private sector is not necessarily more democratic, or even more efficient, than 
FHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW«'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQZDVOLNHO\WRGRQRPRUHWKDQVKLIW
exploitation from one agency to another.45 
Others have noted how this push for decentralization in rule of law and development 
reflect presumptions about the character of the state, particularly in the global South. 
Ferguson describes a µ³QHZ´VWDWH-and-socieW\DSSURDFK¶in African governance literature and 
practice that assumes µWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOVWDWHLVFRUUXSWSDWULPRQLDOVWDJQDQWRXWRIGDWH
and holding back needed change; while the local level (civil society) is understood as neither 
ethnic nor archaic, but as a dynamic, emerging, bustling assemblage of progressive civic 
organizations that could bring about democracy and development if the state would get out of 
WKHZD\¶46 A milder version of this diagnosis appears in DµFRQVWLWXWLRQ-EXLOGLQJPDQXDO¶IRU
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Libya, considered in greater detail in the following section, whose authors claim that 
GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQµUHTXLUHVSROLWLFDOZLOOHVSHFLDOO\RQWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOZKHUHLQFHQWLYHVDUH
RWKHUZLVHDOLJQHGWRUHWDLQDVPXFKSRZHUDVSRVVLEOH¶PHDQZKLOH at the local level, 
µSROLWLFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQLWVHOISURYLGHVDQLPSortant accountability mechanism for local 
populations to restrain authorities that might otherwise act contrary to their interests, either 
benignly through a lack of expertise or capacity, or self-interestedly to benefit local elites or 
VSHFLDOLQWHUHVWV¶47 Here the problems appear to derive from consolidated nation state power 
combined ZLWKLQVXIILFLHQWµH[SHUWLVH¶SROLWLFDOGLDJQRVHVWKDWFDQPDVTXHUDGHDVQHXWUDO
GHVFULSWLRQVXQGHUDµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶GLVFRXUVHWKDW naturalizes particular modes of governance. 
Constitution drafting manuals attempt to simplify and standardize in order to render 
governance more effective, in line with an ideological framing that presumes societies can be 
rendered calculable and designed in accord with scientific laws, and where normative 
positions are presented as descriptive facts. The following section considers how this takes 
place through the textual form of the manual, focusing on textual structures and practices as 
actants within a broader state-building frame.  
 
Seeing like a Manual 
How do constitution drafting manuals act into the broader political economy of post 
Cold War state-building? As textual forms of state inscription, what do they reveal and 
presume about their own objectives and potential effects? From the many examples of 
constitution drafting manuals that could be considered here, I take up two:  one directed to a 
particular state form (post-conflict), and the other directed to a particular state (Libya). The 
Washington D.C-based Public International Law aQG3ROLF\*URXS3,/3*µPost-
&RQIOLFW&RQVWLWXWLRQ'UDIWHU¶V+DQGERRN¶illustrates contemporary convergences around 
peace-building, state-building, and judicial accountability for grave crimes. The International 
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Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), headquartered in Stockholm, 
SURGXFHGWKHµ/LE\D&RQVWLWXWLRQ-%XLOGLQJ0DQXDO¶LQZKLFKZDVGHYHORSHGWRµDVVLVW
the constitution drafters and all other interested parties in their efforts to establish a 
GHPRFUDF\LQWKHUHJLRQ¶48 Although a comparative survey of constitution-drafting 
handbooks and manuals would be a revealing exercise, I forego breadth in the interest of 
closer readings, focusing on these two sites in order to explore what they reveal about textual 
practices of state formation. Both PILPG and IDEA are active participants in the production 
of expert knowledge around constitution drafting, and have broad portfolios that have taken 
them throughout the world in the interest of consolidating best constitutional practices.  
The PILPG handbook reveals a constellation of different actors and interests, both 
SXEOLFDQGSULYDWHDVVKRZQE\WKH1*2¶VFRPSRVLWLRQRIIRUPHU866WDWH'HSDUWPHQWVWDII
and attorneys from elite law firms.49 The handbook itself takes a specialized form, directed at 
post-FRQIOLFWVWDWHVDQGLWFODLPVWKDWLWµGUDZVIURP3,/3*¶VH[SHULHQFHLQIDFLOLWDWLQJSRVW-
conflict constitution drafting processes, as well as comparative state practice, and is based 
upon analysis of over 150 constitutions from post-FRQIOLFWDQGVWDEOHVWDWHV¶50 Two annexes 
are included, one listing the cited constitutions and their locations, and the other compiling 
sample language for specific topics, such as incorporating recognition of international human 
rights norms. 
The handbooN¶VVWUXFWXUHDQGFRPSRVLWLRQLVUHYHDOLQJIRUZKDWLWincludes and 




VHFXULW\¶6LWXDWHGEHWZHHQVXFKIXQGDPHQWDOPDWWHUVIRUVWDWHVRYHUHLJQW\± namely, the 
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economy and defense ± WKHKDQGERRN¶VVWUXFWXUHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHODQJXDJHRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
human rights law should figure centrally within constitutions. 
Chapters are structured through a descriptive introduction ± µ6WDWHVW\SLFDOO\EHJLQ





indivisible, non-transferable, and is derived from and vested in tKHSHRSOHRI>6WDWH@¶ 
7KHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIµVDPSOHODQJXDJH¶LVWKHRYHUDUFKLQJVWUXFWXUDOIHDWXUHRIWKH
handbook itself. It works as a textual device, often presenting two or more options, that offers 
an amalgam of different approaches. Extensive footnotes provide specific examples from the 
ODQJXDJHRIGLIIHUHQWFRQVWLWXWLRQVWKRXJKWKHµVDPSOHODQJXDJH¶LWVHOILVDQHGLWRULDO
decision, reflecting what the handbook drafters consider to be the best possible options. 
These options may or may not directly mirror the language of specific constitutions, and the 
way in which this decision is taken is not explained ± which language from which 
constitutions feature most heavily, whether there might be a more ideal form that is not 
reflected in existing constitutiRQDOWH[WVDQGVRRQ,QWKLVVHQVHWKHµVDPSOHODQJXDJH¶GHYLFH
operates as a black box, transforming a series of hidden editorial steps into congealed best 
practice. 
$VDIRUPRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOWHFKQLFLW\WKHWH[WXDOGHYLFHRIµVDPSOHODQJXDJH¶LVRQH
of the ways in which political investments and decisions are rendered as neutral and technical 
H[SHUWDGYLFH0RUHRYHUWSROLWLFDOLW\LVIRXQGLQUHODWLRQWR3,/3*¶VRZQSDUWLFXODUDUHDVRI
interest at the intersection of peace-building and state-building. For example, a chapter 
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HQWLWOHGµ6HOHFWLQJD6WDWH6WUXFWXUHDQG'HYROYLQJ3RZHU¶EHJLQVZLWKWKHFODLPWKDWµ>S@RVW-
conflict states frequently restructure the state and develop a new system for devolving 
powers. These new systems seek to reflect the values of the post-conflict state, restore 
VWDELOLW\DQGSUHYHQWIXWXUHFRQIOLFW¶51 With such claims, the handbook appears to blur the 
distinction between descriptive and prescriptive, conflating what is with what its drafters 
believe ought to be. It goes on WRH[SUHVVRSLQLRQVVXFKDVWKHFODLPWKDWµ>F@RQIHGHUDWLRQV
tend to be unstable, and may serve as a phase in the process towards full independence of the 
SDUWLHV¶RUSURYLGHDGYLFHDERXWZKDWFDWHJRULHVDUHEHVWWRXVHIRUGHYROXWLRQµ:KHQ
delineating provinces, states often use criteria such as geography and economic viability or 
identity-based criteria such as ethnicity, language, and religion. For instance, most federal 
states create provinces based on criteria related to historical and group identity, as geography 
DQGHFRQRPLFVFDQEHFRPHPDWWHUVRIFRQWHQWLRQ¶52 The footnote used to support this claim 
refers to one scholarly article on federalism.53 The handbook itself offers the choice between 
geography and economics as opposed to history and group identity as if these are discrete 
categories that can be evaluated in relation to one another to determine de-contextualized, de-
historicized best practice. The limits of this either/or approach are not discussed, and the 
language itself suggests that cateJRULHVRIKLVWRULFDORUJURXSLGHQWLW\DUHXQOLNHO\WRµEHFRPH
PDWWHUVRIFRQWHQWLRQ¶ 
Perhaps most notably, the handbook seeks to further shore up the role of expert 
knowledge in constitutional state-EXLOGLQJ,QDVHFWLRQRQµSKDVHGDVVXPSWLRQRISRZHUV¶
for example, an ongoing role for experts is quite literally written in: 
To facilitate effective governance during the post-conflict period, states may 
implement a phased approach to the assumption of powers by provincial 
governments. A phased approach requires the establishment of criteria and a 
roadmap for provinces to allow them to assume additional powers. Such 
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criteria may include a certain time frame or attaining a certain level of 
economic development. The assessment of this criteria might include an 
evaluation process, starting with a panel of experts to determine if criteria 
have been met, followed by a vote in a legislative body.54 
The footnote references language from the Spanish and Italian constitutions on this point, 
which does not mentiRQWKHUROHRIH[SHUWV<HWLQWKHVXJJHVWHGµVDPSOHODQJXDJH¶RQWKH
gradual assumption of power over time, the handbook authors suggest: 
&ULWHULD8VHGီ7RDVVXPHWKHVHSRZHUVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWKHSURYLQFHV
must fulfill certain objective criteria established by law. Such law shall 
include requirements relating to [the size of the population/the maturity of the 
public administration and infrastructure/the degree of economic 
development/a determination of financial capability].  
Evaluation of Criteria:ီ  Upon a decision of the province(s) to assume 
additional powers, a panel of independent experts appointed by the 
[Constitutional Court] shall determine whether the objective criteria have been 
met.  
The decision of the experts shall be forwarded to the [Assembly]. The 
[Assembly] must approve the assumption of power by a resolution adopted by 
a majority of its members.55 
The handbook extends a dominant logic regarding the advantages of devolution, discussed in 
the previous section, which it presents as part of a progressive and evolutionary development 
of the state. Within this suggested frame, a panel of experts would then offer future pastoral 
DVVLVWDQFHVKHSKHUGLQJQDVFHQWSURYLQFHVWRZDUGµWKHDVVXPSWLRQRISRZHU¶LQDSURSHUO\
devolved state. What becomes clear from this passage is the fear of an overly generous 
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interpretive frame, where the act of evaluating criteria might serve as a weak link best left to 
expert knowledge. 
Through textual devices ± IRUH[DPSOHVXJJHVWLQJµVDPSOHODQJXDJH¶DQGUHLI\LQg 
technical expertise ± the PILPG manual conceals its own editorial-political logics, following 
the move described above of presenting policy prescriptions as analytic truths. This manual 
aspires to address a broad audience of transitional states, which are understood as 
transitioning from conflict to post-FRQIOLFWµVWDEOH¶VWDWHIRUPV%\FRQWUDVWWKH,'($PDQXDO
focuses on a single post-FRQIOLFWVWDWH/LE\DDVVHUWLQJWKDWLWLVDµXQLTXHFRXQWU\LQDXQLTXH
VLWXDWLRQ¶WKDWUHTXLUHVSDUWLFXODUDWWHQWLRQ to this unique context. For this reason, its authors 
FRQWHQGLWFRYHUVQRWRQO\µWUDGLWLRQDODUHDVRILPSRUWDQFHLQFOXGLQJWKHVHSDUDWLRQRI
SRZHUVIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVDQGGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ¶EXWDOVRµVRPHDUHDVWKDWDUHVSHFLILFDOO\
relevant to Libya LQFOXGLQJQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDQGFRUUXSWLRQ¶56 If the PILPG manual was 
designed to address post-conflict states writ large, the IDEA manual for Libya offers a 
EHVSRNHDOWHUQDWLYHµLWIRFXVHVPDLQO\RQWKRVHDUHDVWKDWKDYHEHHQLGHQWLILHGDV
particularl\UHOHYDQWWR/LE\D¶UDWKHUWKDQSURFHHGLQJµDORQJFODVVLFDOOLQHV¶57 




drawn from constitutions throughout the world on each point of governance that it addresses, 
beginning from the formulation of supremacy clauses that establish fundamental rights and 
ensure that they are binding upon all branches of the state. The manual is as interesting for 




draw from a number of traditions, includLQJLWVRZQFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶58 The manual 
compiles examples from different constitutions, compares their merits and disadvantages, and 
highlights the contextual specificities of the Arab region where relevant (lack of strong 
judiciaries, the use of legislation to restrict rights, privileging of executive power and 
centralized governments), imagining a terrain on which a constitutional form could be 
constructed de novo based upon best practice.59 In this sense the manual appears to approach 
Libya as a state without an existing constitution, or with one that must be abandoned so that a 
new legal order can be constituted to undo a legacy of abuse through legal forms.  
Reading into the text of the manual for its subtle diagnostic work, a narrative emerges 
of how this aspirational legal order may avoid the mistakes of the past. Like the more general 
3,/3*PDQXDOWKHµ/LE\D&RQVWLWXWLRQ%XLOGLQJ0DQXDO¶WDNHVFDUHWRDYRLGRYHUW
prescriptive formulations. Yet normative positions emerge from the interstices of the text, 
between the constitutional excerpts and the detached authorial voice analyzing them. The 
manual adopts a standpoint of skepticism toward the state:  absent a clearly posited 
constitutional framework leaving little room for interpretation, rights will be curtailed 
through legislation. Parliaments, presidents, and the judiciary are not to be trusted. For 
H[DPSOHWKHPDQXDOVWDWHVWKDWSDUWLFXODUSKUDVLQJLQWKH&KLOHDQFRQVWLWXWLRQµLV
problematic, because it invites the government, parliament, and courts to limit freedom of 
FRQVFLHQFHEDVHGRQWKUHHKLJKO\VXEMHFWLYHYDOXHV¶± morals, good customs, and public order 
± µWKDWDUHQRWGHILQHGDQ\ZKHUHLQWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶60 Interpretive discretion is risky; instead, 
constitutions should be liberated from µYDJXHDQGVXEMHFWLYHSKUDVHV¶DQGµDPELJXRXV
ODQJXDJHWKDWZLOODOORZIRUDUELWUDU\OLPLWDWLRQV¶RIIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVµ7HUPVVXFKDV
SXEOLFRUGHUZHOIDUHDQGPRUDOVDUHKLJKO\VXEMHFWLYHDQGKDYHQRVHWWOHGOHJDOGHILQLWLRQV¶
WKHPDQXDOFRQWHQGVµ,nternational attempts to define these terms still leave limitations 
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HVVHQWLDOO\XQUHVWUDLQHG¶ZKLFKPDNHVWKHPµYXOQHUDEOHWRWKHZLOORIDFRXQWU\¶VOHDGHUV¶61 
Within this narrative of constitutionalism, vagueness opens space for interpretive 
abuse, and discretion for political interest. The manual appears to valorize detail, clarity, clear 
definition of terms, and express restrictions on power with the objective of diffusing it. At the 
same time, there are risks of stating too much, and sometimes it is possible that explicitly 
inscribing what is prohibited may be seen as authorizing what is not VDLGµ/LVWLQJVRPH
rights as non-derogable may, however, make other fundamental rights appear more limitable 
DQGPDNHWKHPPRUHYXOQHUDEOHWRFRPSOHWHGHURJDWLRQGXULQJWLPHVRIHPHUJHQF\¶62 In this 
ZD\WKHPDQXDOPLJKWEHVDLGWRHQJDJHLQZKDW(YH6HGJZLFNGHVFULEHVDVµSDUDQRLG
UHDGLQJ¶DQLQWHUSUHWLYHVWDQFHRIVXVSicion that anticipates negative surprises and produces a 
µIXWXUH-RULHQWHGYLJLODQFH¶63 These constitution manuals seek to construct a regulatory 
architecture that will mitigate risks, limit harms and address injustices in post-conflict states 
where legal forms have been misappropriated by political actors and forces. The foil to the 
XQWUXVWZRUWK\VWDWHDQGWKHWKUHDWRIODZ¶VFDSWXUHE\SROLWLFDOLQWHUHVWVLVWKHSXUHGUHDPRI
the constitution itself:  a messianic form that can only exist aspirationally in the margins of 
these textsµVDPSOHODQJXDJH¶XQPHGLDWHGE\WKHSROLWLFDOFRQWHVWDWLRQVRIOHJLVODWLQJD
constitution into being. 
Aspirations and Archives  
As a textual intervention in statecraft, the constitution drafting manual is only as felicitous as 
its broader political context allows. These texts are pre-constitutional, informing the 
background work of constitutional production without taking on a distinct life of their own. 
Once their use-value is extracted they seem to recede from view, as artifacts or remains of a 
process that lives on through constitutions themselves and the mobile field of technicians 
who continue to inform their drafting. In the assemblage of constitutional production, the 
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constitution drafting manual or handbook appears relatively inert, overshadowed by the 
broader political economy of statecraft.  
Yet these texts offer rich sites for exploring an under-theorized technology of state-
ness. Contrary to the idea that constitution drafting manuals are inert forms, they serve as 
sites of normative production and reproduction, repositories of value that belie their seeming 
technical and apolitical self-presentation. In this sense they offer a case study for considering 
ODZ¶VPDWHULDOIRUPV± legal materiality ± by addressing one of the mediums through which 
constitutional law and statehood are produced.64 Writing about record keeping and filing 
practices, Cornelia Vismann observed how certain textual forms reveal histories of legal 
production: 
[files] not only fix a result but also shed light on their own development, on that 
which precedes grand acts of writing such as the clean copy or the legal institutes 
and institutions. That is, they allow access to that which came before the law, the 
legally binding verdict, the issued deed. Within the imagined chain of supplements 
for the spoken language, supplements, files are closest to the presence of speech. 
Hence they attract all researchers who are interested in origins and who leaf 
through written documents in search of the words that once were spoken.65 
Just as files operate as traces of institutional practices, mediating and acting into the 
production of law, manuals and handbooks that provide guidance for constitution drafting 
speak the background code of contemporary constitutional thinking. They record a possibility 
RIZKDWPD\KDYHVHWWKHWHUPVµZKLFKFDPHEHIRUHWKHODZ¶UHJLVWHULQJWKHFRQYHUJHQFHRI
constitutional technicity around certain forms and vocabularies of governance. As part of a 
broader dispositif or apparatus of state formation, their practices of knowledge production 
and ways of naturalizing particular views of state-ness require further consideration. 
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